How to Read Hegel on/at the End of History

Rutwij Nakhwa, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, rutwijnakhawa@gmail.com

Abstract
On the backdrop of the diagnoses of our present time as a time without time, characterized by an emptied-out history and endless present of and at the end of history, this paper proposes that this backdrop makes our contemporary time the most apt for engaging with Hegel – the inaugural thinker of the end of history. Apparently, the most apt place to engage with Hegel today would be his philosophy of history. However, because this part of Hegel's philosophy is one of the most controversial (attacked and dismissed by critics and ignored by Hegelians), this paper takes the form of a ground-clearing exercise for a possible contemporary reading of Hegel's philosophy of history and his philosophy more generally. This exercise will grapple with received notions about Hegelian history, both at its worst – teleologically culminating in the rational and/or totalitarian state at the end of history – and at its seeming best: not a history that ends but points to a future society premised on mutual recognition. This paper attempts to destabilize both of these polar interpretive tendencies in a wager to renew dialectical thinking of history for our time, engaging, among others, Paolo Virno's work on the end of history.

Keywords: Hegel, End of History, Philosophy of History, Owl of Minerva, Paolo Virno

Introduction

Our contemporary situation bears a peculiar relationship to history and temporality. We collectively experience the endless seriality of crises with an almost fatalistic attitude of inevitability: in a time of total crises-ridden and -driven uncertainty, the one thing we can feel absolutely certain about is that there will be another crisis after this one. Past crises seamlessly blend into present ones, which always already anticipate crises in (and of) the future. In other words, the past-present-future crisis coalesces into an endless present of crisis. The truth of this collective experience of the endless present is evidenced by the fact that it is difficult to pinpoint when and how history evaporated, marking the (absent) beginning of this interminable present. This experience has been diagnosed variously as that of a «lost future»[1] or «presentism»[2] – a time when the time of the present dominates over the past and the future, rendering these categories and time itself irrelevant: time becomes an endlessly dilating space. For François Hartog, presentism names a time wherein:

> […] the production of historical time seems to be suspended. Perhaps this is what generates today's sense of a permanent, elusive, and almost immobile present, which nevertheless attempts to create its own historical time. It is as though there were nothing but the present, like an immense stretch of water restlessly rippling.[3]

[1] Fisher (2014).
[2] Hartog (2015).
[3] Ivi, 17-18.

More than a quarter of a century ago, Paolo Virno already connected this (a)historical-(a)temporal situation with a collective social experience of déjà vu – the feeling that everything that we experience has already happened before, that there can be nothing new under the sun, and everything is a repetition of the past.[4] Virno diagnoses this experience of/as "the end of history." However, the conception of the end of history can be traced back via Francis Fukuyama and Alexander Kojève ultimately to Hegel. If Hegel is the culprit who declared history to be at an end, then we, seemingly living at and through the end of history, are living a peculiarly Hegelian time. How to read Hegel now in our "Hegelian" end-historical timeless time?

The idea of the end of history emerges in Hegel's philosophy of history, which already raises some questions. If history is at an end, why should there even be a philosophy of history? Merely to call the time of history's death? The famous Hegelian answer is that the owl of Minerva – philosophy – flies only at dusk; philosophy's task is to comprehend reality, but it can do so only after the fact, when everything's finished, it can only think «a shape of life grown old»[5]. Thus, the end of history is, as it were, the condition of possibility of a philosophy of history. This would then mean that exactly now, at the end of history, is the time for a philosophy of history. From which it would follow that, today, the most apt entry point into Hegel's philosophy would be his philosophy of history. However, it turns out that for anyone wanting to seriously engage with Hegel today, his philosophy of history is probably the worst place to start. Because, paradoxically, it has received too much and too little attention. Too much attention from non-specialists and anti-Hegelians who take the *Philosophy of History*, and *only* this work, as representative of Hegel's thought as a whole, and thus easily stereotype and dismiss him, for instance, as a teleological anti-individualist[6]. Too little attention from the major, contemporary Hegel scholars who avoid the *Philosophy of History* «like the plague»[7].

At all accounts, one of the apparently most relevant parts of Hegel's philosophy – his philosophy of history – is read only to be dismissed by uncharitable critics, totally ignored by Hegelians, or read in a "deflationary" anti-metaphysical manner. These reactions to Hegel's thought about history are somewhat understandable, given some of Hegel's grand statements on the matter, which this paper will treat. As the paper shows, most anti-Hegelian

[4] Virno (2015), first published in the original Italian in 1999.
[5] Hegel (2008, 16).
[6] Some of these famous anti-Hegelians include Croce (1915, 140): «Before Hegel seeks the data of facts, he knows what they must be» and Popper (1966, 27): «it was child's play for his [Hegel's] powerful dialectical methods to draw real physical rabbits out of purely metaphysical silk-hats». For accounts of such dismissals, see McGowan (2019, 131-132) and Ruda (2016, 101-104). McGowan argues that the *Philosophy of History* is not representative of Hegel's overall philosophical system because its pivotal terms, such as the «world historical individual», appear nowhere else in Hegel's oeuvre.
[7] «The majority of the significant interpreters of Hegel writing today – Slavoj Žižek, Catherine Malabou, Rebecca Comay, Sally Sedgwick, and Susan Buck-Morss, just to name a few – avoid the *Philosophy of History*like the plague» (McGowan 2019, 145). McGowan's comment here might be exaggerated. An anonymous reviewer of this paper adduced Buck-Morss (2009) as falsifying the claim that prominent Hegelians avoid the *Philosophy of History*. To be sure, Buck-Morss's deservedly famous book mainly engages in its «Part One: Hegel and Haiti» Hegel's master-slave dialectic from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the context of Haiti's revolutionary history and while «Part Two: Universal History» does directly refer to Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, this reference is only to castigate Hegel (rightly!) for his Eurocentric cultural racism. Buck-Morss (2009, 115) also echoes Karl Löwith's argument that Hegelian history is a secularized form of Christian teleology, which I discuss below.

interpretations dismiss Hegel as an anti-individualistic totalitarian and religious thinker who completely forecloses individual human freedom. Of course, these readings have nowadays fallen out of fashion and Hegel has instead (re)emerged as *the* philosopher of freedom. However, we must also consider what the status of this freedom is, of which Hegel is the so-called champion. In making Hegel more acceptable to the contemporary world, his defenders (Habermas included) have emphasized, against the charges of totalitarianism, the opposite pole of purely individualized freedom and thereby, at times, almost turned Hegel into someone he is not, namely Kant.

Perhaps the Hegel that speaks to our time is neither a religious totalitarian nor a liberal individualist but a Hegel who rejects this forced choice that today is increasingly not even a choice but a mutually fueling perverse unity of opposites. As Hegel famously writes in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the true has to be grasped not only as substance but also as subject[8], which, in this context, could be paraphrased: the truth of freedom has to be grasped neither as merely a collective substance nor a purely individualized subject.

This paper takes the form of a ground-clearing exercise for a possible contemporary reading of Hegel's philosophy of history and his philosophy more generally. This exercise will grapple with received notions about Hegelian history, both at its worst – teleologically culminating in the rational and/or totalitarian state and the end of history – and at its seeming best: not a history that ends but points to a future society premised on mutual recognition. This paper attempts to destabilize both of these polar reading tendencies in a wager to renew dialectical thinking of history for our time. The first section takes up the charge that Hegel's philosophy of history is a secularization of the Christian notion of providence, i.e., a teleological history inexorably progressing towards a final end-goal – the rational state, which the second section examines. The third section addresses the opposite pole of interpretation, namely, the Kantianized Hegel interpretation of mutual recognition theorists, and, finally, the fourth section concludes the paper with a reflection on the end of history thesis attributed to Hegel.

1. History as teleology?

As per Karl Löwith's influential account, Hegel philosophically translates the Christian notion of providence into history's unfolding[9]. But whereas providence as God's predetermined will for the world is radically unknowable, for Hegel, God's plan is knowable through human reason. Thus, for Löwith, God's will becomes a transcending purpose that unconsciously directs the passionate, self-interested actions that individuals pursue with a kind of «animal faith»[10] and makes the very idea of (individual) human freedom «ambiguous»[11]. He views Hegel as transposing the Christian idea of final judgment at the end of all history within the historical process itself. Löwith's reading is based on an accurate but *literal* consideration of some of Hegel's grand claims. For instance, Hegel writes:

> The insight to which philosophy ought to lead, therefore […], is that the real world is as it ought to be, that the truly good, the universal divine reason is also the power capable of

[8] Hegel (1977, 10).
[9] Löwith (1949, 56-59).
[10] Ivi, 55.
[11] Ivi, 58.

> actualizing itself. This good, this reason – in its most concrete representation – is God. God governs the world: the content of His governance, the fulfillment of His plan, is world history. Philosophy seeks to understand this plan: for only what is fulfilled according to that plan has reality; what is not in accord with it, is but a worthless existence. In the pure light of this divine idea (which is no mere ideal) the illusion that the world is a mad or foolish happening disappears. Philosophy seeks to know the content, the actuality of the divine idea, and to justify the despised reality – for reason is the perception of God's work[12].

Ultimately, Löwith easily dismisses Hegel as too outdated and too Christian for the modern world. According to Simon Lumsden, Löwith's «comprehensive teleological account» of Hegel's philosophy of history assumes that, for Hegel, history has a predetermined end given by a supra-individual entity (whether God or spirit).

However, Löwith's interpretation is not without its problems. To be sure, for Hegel, world history does not begin with the conscious goals of its individual actors but with a universal goal of the fulfillment of the spirit's concept. However, this goal, the concept, is not pregiven to consciousness (of individuals) but rather is an «innermost, unconscious drive»[13] that the historical process makes conscious. In Lumsden's account, the individual is interested in an inchoate or implicit principle, which they passionately pursue until its accomplishment[14]. Universal laws and principles do not exist until they are made actual through individual agency[15]. Against Löwith, Lumsden asserts:

> There is a logic to history's development, and its transformations must be conceived as necessary, but this does not mean that history's trajectory is progressing towards *an end* that reason or a supra-individual cosmic spirit has designed for human existence[16].

Lumsden highlights retroactivity[17], a central motif in all of Hegel's philosophy, and argues that while freedom remains the necessary end goal of history, this in no way allows a prediction of the exact path through which this goal will be realized in history. This path can only be retroactively understood as necessary *after* its actual manifestation in history. In other words, philosophy of history can only understand the necessity of «what has happened»[18]. Or, more strongly, as Slavoj Žižek asserts, «things are not what they are, they "will have been", their truth is decided retroactively»[19]. Hence, Hegel's philosophy of history cannot be thought of as teleological in any strong sense.

In Hegel's manuscript of the introduction to the final set of lectures (1830-31) on the philosophy of world history, he writes:

> the final end, the destiny, or the nature and concept of spirit *in itself*, is purely universal and abstract. A principle, fundamental rule, or law is something universal and inward, which as such is not completely actual, however true it may be in itself. Purposes, principles, and the like

[12] Hegel (1988, 39).
[13] Ivi, 27.
[14] Lumsden (2020, 467-470).
[15] Hegel (1988, 35).
[16] Lumsden (2020, 467, original italics).
[17] To be sure, even Löwith (1949, 58) acknowledges Hegelian retroactivity but without much credence: Hegel is not «a prophet predicting future catastrophe but […] a prophet in reverse, surveying and justifying the ways of the spirit by its successive successes».
[18] Lumsden (2020, 472).
[19] Žižek (2020, 305).

> are in our thoughts, only in our inner intentions, or also in books, but not yet in actuality. In other words, what is only implicit is a possibility, a potency, but it has not yet come out from its inwardness into existence; [it is] one-sided ([like] philosophy [itself]). A second moment is needed to arrive at its actuality, that of activation, of actualization, and the principle of that is the will, the activity of human beings in general in the world. It is only through this activity that the [original] concept, the implicit determinations, are realized and actualized[20].

Hegel insists that no purpose in and of history can be actualized without the activity of human agents. More recently, echoing Löwith's criticism, David Carr has charged Hegel with an anti-enlightenment closure of the historical process, reducing subjects to passive, externally determined non-agents[21]. *Pace* Carr, Hegel cannot be accused of robbing individuals of their agency. Because, for Hegel, as the above-quoted passage demonstrates, spirit's end goal can only be realized *through* individual actions; the idea in itself is nothing without its concrete manifestation and realization through human activity[22]. Further, Hegel insists that such historically meaningful action cannot be based on coercion, especially in the modern age, wherein individuals do not simply act based on trust and authority but increasingly «wish rather to dedicate their share of activity to a cause on the basis of their own understanding and independent conviction and estimation»[23]. He asserts «the infinite right of the subjective individual, to satisfy himself in his activity and work»[24], without which nothing can be achieved in history. Hence, contrary to the typical understanding of reason determining individuals, the more appropriate central question of Hegel's philosophy of history is how reason can determine anything in history if history's agents are self-determining individuals[25].

Emphasizing individual agency, Lumsden locates historical conflict between the passions and interests of *individuals* and not so much between the individual and the universal: «passion is not by its nature in conflict with justice»[26]. And even if the «universal structures of right may be in conflict with the particular pursuits of individuals but this does not negate the universality of its laws»[27]. Surprisingly, Lumsden undermines the dialectical relation between the individual and the universal and relegates all conflict to the side of individuals over whom the universal dominates. The universal remains in a sort of "Platonic" ideal realm, untouched by the banality of merely human conflict. Whereas the whole task of Hegel's philosophy of history is to think about how individual actions can have trans-individual, i.e., universal consequences. Thus, while Lumsden seriously considers the retroactive dimension of Hegel's thinking of history, the universal for him becomes a substantial reality, albeit one that we can only identify retroactively.

In sum, the accounts of Löwith and Carr charge Hegel's philosophy with a teleological closure of the historical process and agents because they do not take the dimension of retroactivity seriously. But, as the next section discusses, even perspicuous commentators like Lumsden, who take retroactivity seriously, can succumb to substantializing the universal in the form of the institutionalized freedom of the state.

---

[20] Hegel (2011, 91).
[21] Carr (2014, 95).
[22] Hegel (1988, 25).
[23] Hegel (2011, 92).
[24] Hegel (1988, 25). Hegel (2011, 91-92).
[25] Lumsden (2020, 474).
[26] Ivi, 475.
[27] *Ibidem*.

2. The state: only as substance and not as subject

For Hegel, in the course of world history, the state is the ethical unity, the «whole» that reconciles the subjective and the objective (universal)[28]. He remarks:

> There are two elements that enter into our topic: the first is the idea, the other is human passion; the first is the warp, the other the woof in the great tapestry of world history that is spread out before us. The concrete meeting point and union of the two is in ethical freedom in the state[29].

Freedom thus takes a paradoxical form of obedience to laws of the state insofar as the individuals recognize them as the very substance of their being[30]. As per the *Philosophy of Right*, for the ethical subject, the laws and their powers «are – "are" in the highest sense of self-subsistent being. This is an absolute authority and power infinitely more firmly established than the being of nature»[31]. For Hegel, society's major institutions (religion, philosophy, and art) have a fundamental identity of their substance with that of the state and form «an indissoluble unity with the spirit of the state»[32]. These assertions about the substantial being of laws, institutions and, ultimately, the state, understandably expose Hegel (again) to the charge of anti-individualism. However, it is important to note that Hegel is here and elsewhere responding to the Kantian conception of freedom as the subject's moral autonomy, a conception that gives rise to what the scholarship has termed the paradox of autonomy[33]. To make it brief, the paradox is that the self-legislation (giving oneself one's own law, which the self must obey), either presupposes some existing lawful framework in which case it is not autonomous – Hegel famously takes Kant to task for his example of the categorical imperative against making into a maxim the false promise to repay a loan because it presupposes and absolutizes the historically specific law of private property[34] – or the self-legislation is totally ungrounded and therefore arbitrary. In a nutshell, autonomy is either already lawful or lawless, and, therefore, in both cases, fully destroyed[35]. In contrast to the Kantian conception, for Hegel, freedom has to be objectivized or actualized through relatively stable social institutional forms, which Hegel designates as the rational state. *Bildung* (education, culture, formation) is the process of this actualization. However, the important point is that *Bildung* does not establish the state as a stable substance once and for all but rather is radically historical and, even more crucially, a historically unfolding *process* without a predetermined *telos*[36]. As Bart Zantvoort suggests, by Hegel's own account, the Hegelian vision of unity and identity (of human passion, laws, and institutions with the state) is illusory. Zantvoort argues that while, at the time of their formation, laws and institutions faithfully express the needs, desires, and intentions of the community of their individual creators, gradually, social life becomes ossified through this very institutionalization and

[28] Hegel (1988, 42).
[29] Ivi, 26.
[30] Ivi, 42.
[31] Hegel (2008, 155, §146).
[32] PH, 55-56.
[33] Menke (2013, 13-20).
[34] Hegel (2008, 130-135, §135-138).
[35] Menke (2013, 16).
[36] Menke (2017, 166).

fixing of social-property relations[37]. For Lumsden, too, this gap between an existent form of ethical life and an emergent universal drives history:

> Dissatisfactions with or failures of existing norms incrementally undermine the coherence of a form of life. The cunning of reason marks the way in which the deficiencies in a form of life come to be corrected and the retrospective recognition of the necessity for this correction marks those transitions as rational[38].

Lumsden argues that modern reason is always dissatisfied with existing norms of self-interpretation and ways of life, which, therefore, are constantly transforming. Thus, the historical process understood as the attempt at self-comprehension is «infinite»[39].

Similarly, Andreas Arndt notes that while Hegel was at Jena, Hegel thought that the true need of philosophy is living with dissatisfaction through existing reality[40]. However, Lumsden contends that the modern state can contain historical change without the collapse of a form of life[41]. For him, the destructiveness of the political-historical process is, as it were, sublimated by *Bildung*. As a result, Lumsden inadvertently subscribes to a kind of weak teleology wherein the state and *Bildung* can, ultimately, contain and manage all (individual) dissatisfactions with reality. Further, in light of the global ecological crises, Lumsden would rather problematize the concept of spirit itself but not the state.[42] Tereza Matějčková further substantializes the state by reading Hegel's philosophy of history as a narrative of evolving social infrastructure and argues that Hegel's conception of freedom through institutionalization sidesteps the subject[43]. Problematically, she views Hegel's philosophy of history as a narrative of actions by enlightened individuals who must nevertheless die before they are retroactively recognized as being enlightened. Thus, for her, the *telos* of Hegel's philosophy of history is a transition from world-historical «heroes» fighting for freedom to a world where freedom's objectivization in the state and other institutions makes fighting for freedom or even its consciousness superfluous. In contrast, for Hegel, far from the state being a stable substance, the very institutionalization of the state is coextensive with its ossification. According to Zantvoort, the more a society develops in terms of individual freedom, prosperity, and powerful and effective states, the greater is the potential for increased social and political inertia, alienation, social tension, and violent revolutions[44]. As per Hegel, the existence of the state is what renders the present incomplete and, thereby, creates the need for history in the first place: «the external existence of the state, with its rational laws and customs, is an incomplete present, the understanding of which calls for incorporating the awareness of its past [history][45]». While Matějčková's account of Hegel's philosophy of history gestures towards Kantian-sounding ideas of cosmopolitan progress, for Hegel, world history is instead the theatre of warring nation-states – an image of history apposite to our contemporary.

---

[37] Zantvoort (2018, 125). See Hegel (2008, 307-308, §324A, original emphasis).
[38] Lumsden (2020, 476).
[39] Ivi, 478.
[40] Arndt (2020, 464).
[41] Lumsden (2020, 480-83).
[42] Lumsden (2018).
[43] Matějčková (2019).
[44] Zantvoort (2018, 127-131).
[45] Hegel (2011, 116).

The point of this section has been to emphasize that the question of the modern state is far from settled. For Mladen Dolar, a major deficiency of the Left is its failure to develop an emancipatory theory of the state. As per him, the central problem of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* was to conceive of a state that could capture the spirit of revolution from which it emerged and think of a form of state wherein this revolutionary spirit would endure. Dolar's point is to see the state not merely as an enemy or ally but as a site of political struggle wherein politics is not something that happens «outside and against the state»[46] – therefore, thinking the state not only as substance but also as subject. We also live after the collapse of what may be called Hegel's fantasy of the rational state that could restrict the capitalist market to the sphere of civil society[47]. Rather than pointing to the end of history in a rational state, Hegel's philosophy of history points to the double failures of the state, on the one hand, to rein in capitalism and, on the other hand, to ensure cosmopolitan peace.

The first two sections critically discussed interpretations of Hegel's philosophy of history that (both unfavorably and favorably to Hegel) emphasize the universal aspect of history against the individual. The next section discusses the more "progressive" liberal interpretations that articulate a somewhat abstracted form of the substantial state and find in Hegel's philosophy a blueprint of a future society to be realized in an indefinitely deferred future.

3. There is no future society

While Hegel is generally credited for introducing history into philosophy, Kant already had some intriguing reflections on history outside of his three *Critiques*. Kant's writings on history contain a theoretical device similar to the Hegelian cunning of reason to explain historical progress, which has been called the «cunning of nature»[48]. For Kant, the cunning of nature describes how conscious individual freedom takes the form of an unconscious social antagonism (i.e., the incompatibility of social relations due to envy, vanity, and insatiable desire for power and possession) that paradoxically pushes human freedom to its apotheosis in the creation of a moral society and a cosmopolitan world[49]. However, for Kant, the cunning of nature is a mere assumption, a philosophical heuristic device to make sense of history[50]. Whereas for Hegel, the cunning of reason is the actual, concrete, and necessary way in which spirit unfolds in history. Yirmiahu Yovel remarks that although this difference makes Hegel's cunning of reason the more coherent, developed, and comprehensive theory, it also makes Hegel fundamentally wrong about history, whereas Kant's weaker, regulative heuristic of the cunning of nature remains valid insofar as it is merely a subjective reflective judgment without any objective ontological commitment.[51]

[46] Dolar, Hamza, Ruda (2020, 487).
[47] Dolar (2022).
[48] Yovel (1980, 8-9).
[49] Kant (1991).
[50] Wood (2006, 249).
[51] Yovel (1980, 8, 24). Also see Wood (2006, 249).

Pace Yovel, I want to defend Hegel's philosophical conception of history but without turning him into Kant like the dominant Anglo-American scholarship.[52] For instance, Brandom asserts that:

> the principal positive practical lesson of Hegel's analysis of the nature of modernity […] is that if we properly digest the achievements and failures of modernity, we can build on them new, better kinds of institutions, practices, and self-conscious selves—ones that are normatively superior because they embody a greater self-consciousness, a deeper understanding of the kind of being we are[53].

Thus, the antagonisms of modernity become the ground for a future, morally superior society. Similarly, for Pippin, Hegel

> focuses our attention on the experience of normative insufficiency, on a breakdown in a form of life (a situation wherein we cannot make them any longer our own), and thereby, through such a *via negativa*, tries to provide a general theory of re-constituted positive normative authority out of such breakdowns[54].

In contrast, Hegel opposes any such moral dissatisfaction with the present:

> What makes people morally dissatisfied (and this is a dissatisfaction upon which they pride themselves) is that they do not see the present as measuring up to the goals they hold as right and good. This applies especially to contemporary ideal models of political institutions – thus contrasting the way things *are* with the way they *ought* to be[55].

Hegel is the philosopher par excellence of how things are: «the real world is as it ought to be[56]. The more famous version of this slogan is «What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational»[57]. However, a few paragraphs earlier, I discussed Hegel's dissatisfaction with existing reality during his Jena days. So, is the actuality of the rational and the rationality of the actual just an old man's resignation in contrast to the burning dissatisfaction of his younger days?

Referring to Hegel's manuscript versions of the quoted slogan and Heinrich Heine's anecdote from attending Hegel's lectures, Dolar suggests that Hegel vacillated with another version of this line: «what is rational must be [*muss sein*]»[58]. To be sure, unlike Kant's famous distinction between «is» [*Sein*] and «ought» [*Sollen*], Dolar explains that Hegel is aiming precisely at the intersection between is and ought. In opposition to the Kantian understanding

---

[52] As an anonymous reviewer noted, I do not have space here to do justice to the nuances of the Anglo-American scholarship. As it stands, this section serves as a provocation questioning the hegemony of this line of interpretation. Another reviewer directed me to the work of Rahel Jaeggi (2018) on history as a dialectic of crises or problems that demand their historically specific solutions or transformation(s) of the problematic, crises-ridden form of life. In essence, this interpretation is compatible with the Anglo-American one. However, I plan to engage with Jaeggi in more detail in the future.
[53] Brandom, (2019, 470-471).
[54] Pippin (2008, 91, original emphasis).
[55] Hegel (1988, 37). The translator's footnote on this page suggests that Kant is the implicit target of Hegel's remark.
[56] Ivi, 39.
[57] Hegel (2008, 14).
[58] Dolar (2015, 881-884).

[*Verstand*] that presupposes the subject-object divide, Hegelian reason [*Vernunft*] knows no such distinctions. Dolar writes:

> Hence, philosophy can never simply teach the world how it ought to be, that is, to extricate the rational essence and impose it on existence. This has traditionally been philosophy's delusion of grandeur, there was no lack of it, to dispense recipes how the world should be according to reason, and to feel slighted if the world didn't want to oblige and comply. We have such good ideas but people are too stupid to get them. This is for Hegel precisely not to take the actuality of thought seriously.[59]

To project an illusion of how things ought to be is to give up on the actuality of thinking.

While focusing on the unexpected goodness of apparently bad events, the above interpretations overlook the opposite case, which Hegel evokes, that of seemingly good or justifiable actions going awry. Anticipating his discussion of the cunning of reason, Hegel gives the example of a man who, perhaps justly, seeks revenge on his enemy and, thus, sets the latter's house on fire. Unintended by the revenger, the fire burns down the entire neighborhood, and the apparently just act of vengeance turns into a punishable crime of arson[60]. For Hegel, this implies that «the substance of an action, and thus the action itself, can turn against the agent, recoiling against him, to destroy him»[61]. Therefore, against Brandom's thesis of *The Spirit of Trust* in a future, non-violent society of mutual recognition of the co-dependency of human life, Žižek calls for a «spirit of distrust», which accepts that there is no direct path to concrete freedom and the only possible reconciliation is to resign ourselves «to the permanent threat of destruction, which is a positive condition of our freedom»[62].

According to Jure Simoniti, the interpretations of Brandom, Pippin, and Pinkard[63] «understand Hegel's social thought in terms of discursive practices and mutual recognition between rational agents»[64]. Simoniti argues against such rehabilitations of Hegel that reduce history to a neutral vehicle of society gaining rational self-consciousness. And, even when interpreters like Pippin and Pinkard «half-heartedly» concede the negative and destructive force of history, they make it subservient to a higher normative process of social institutions being progressively established through the course of history. For Simoniti, these liberal interpretations of Hegel turn history into a regulative, asymptotic principle similar to Habermas's «ideal speech situation», which is infamously interminable but nevertheless impossibly tries to approximate something ideal[65]. Thus, Simoniti charges these Anglo-American interpreters, whom he describes as «normativists» and «recognitionists», with smuggling «Kant's idea of perpetual peace into Hegel's history of warring realms[66]» So, any interpretation of Hegel that finds in his work the blueprint of «a future society reconciled with itself» does not do justice to retroactivity as well as to the power of negativity – the possibility

[59] Ivi, 887.
[60] Hegel (1988, 30-31).
[61] Ivi, 31.
[62] Žižek (2020, 311).
[63] Pinkard (2012).
[64] Simoniti (2020, 203).
[65] Ivi, 204. For Matějčková (2019, 207), Hegel's insistence on the state as objectivized freedom shifts freedom's understanding from an individual possession and intention to a more dialogical model of a free concrete act in a public space and the act's conditions and consequences. She contends that history has no final judgment but is a constant process of retrospective self-judgment and self-reflectivity. For her, Hegel secularizes the Christian idea of a final judgment into the judgment of the coming generations.
[66] Simoniti (2020, 204).

of destructive reversals – that Hegel highlights vis-à-vis the cunning of reason and elsewhere. To be sure, this dream of a future society is closely linked to the notorious Hegelian thesis of the end of history, a history that ends (or has already ended) in precisely such a future society of mutual recognition.

4. The end of history, again

Typically, Hegel's end of history thesis is used to charge him with a necessary, predetermined, teleological conception of historical progress. However, as discussed above, the persistence of ossified social structures beyond obsolescence already undermines the necessity of historical progress.[67] For Hegel, «The *final goal of the world* […] is spirit's consciousness of its freedom, and hence also the actualization of that very freedom»[68]. According to Todd McGowan, the great insight of Hegel's *Science of Logic* is that contradictions in thought entail contradictions in being[69], and hence, for Hegel, «the thought of contradiction is the essential moment of the concept»[70]. McGowan argues that, for Hegel, freedom arises from the contradictory nature of all being (even God) and, hence, the inconsistency of all authority.[71] Based on the *Logic*'s definition of freedom, McGowan claims that freedom is no longer an idea separated from any material origin but becomes the ideal correlate of the contradictory structure of being. As a result, for him, the end of history is simply the inescapable realization that, given the contradictory nature of all being, we are all free, a realization that historically unfolded in modern Europe, Haiti, and North America.[72] In other words, the end of history condemns us to freedom.

McGowan argues against two of the most prominent interpreters of Hegel's end of history thesis, Kojève and Fukuyama. The most influential in the 20th century, Kojève's interpretation idiosyncratically reads Hegel's philosophy of history through the *Phenomenology's* lordship-bondsman dialectic (Kojève's "master-slave" dialectic) as *the* drive of historical progress.[73] Reductively put, for Kojève, history ends when slaves finally revolt against their master(s) and establish a non-conflictual society of mutual recognition. And Kojève locates history's definitive end, variously, in the post-French Revolution Napoleonic regime, then in American capitalism and, finally, in Japanese «snobbism»[74]. On the other hand, Fukuyama claimed that history ended with (neo-liberal) capitalism's planetary defeat of communism in 1989.[75]

To be sure, McGowan also argues against Žižek's «modest» claim that Hegel's end of history thesis implies that there is no exit from history because every epoch experiences itself as living at history's end.[76] Thus, McGowan agrees with Kojève and Fukuyama that history

[67] Zantvoort (2018, 128).
[68] Hegel (1988, 22).
[69] McGowan (2019, 134, 139).
[70] Hegel (2010, 745)
[71] Even in the philosophy of history, Hegel obliquely makes this point. He characterizes thought as the innermost, infinite form of negativity that dissolves everything that exists and appears as objective, given, immediate, and as authority (PH, 80-81).
[72] McGowan (2019, 137-142).
[73] Kojève (1980, 50), McGowan (2019, 139-141).
[74] McGowan (2019, 141).
[75] Fukuyama (1989, 3-18), McGowan (2019, 138-139).
[76] McGowan (2019, 137-142).

has an actual end: both a terminus and a goal (i.e., freedom) reached at the terminus. However, he disagrees with Kojève and Fukuyama on the implications of history's end. For Kojève, history ends in a non-contradictory society of mutual recognition, which goes against Hegel's definition of freedom as the ideal correlate of being as contradictory. Similarly, for Fukuyama, history's end is the end of all political struggle, whereas for McGowan, the end of history marks the beginning of authentic political struggle. Because, given that, at history's end, freedom is ineluctable, subjects must struggle for a form of life most suitable for freedom. But, given this account of the unsurpassability of the realization of freedom at the end of history, why doesn't history *actually* end after its end?

McGowan answers that Hegel lectured on the philosophy of history in the 1820s and early 1830s in the aftermath of the American, French, and Haitian revolutions, which, in their realization of freedom, seemed to have irreversibly transformed the world and allowed Hegel to declare the end of history.[77] However, since Hegel's death, this realization of freedom has been repeatedly covered over through attempts at establishing new authority in the world. And Hegel never dealt with the question of what would happen if, after the ineluctable realization of freedom, people simply don't want to be free? Thus, McGowan ventures an answer through Freud's theory of neurosis. At history's end, the neurotic subject very well confronts the absence of any consistent authority but, instead of accepting the consequent freedom, erects a fantasy of a non-contradictory and consistent authority. Two guises of this fantasy are naturalism (the fantasy of nature as an undivided, self-consistent authority) and fundamentalism (belief in God, ethnicity, or nation as non-contradictory authority). For McGowan, the symptomatic eruption of fundamentalist violence globally is the impossible attempt to substantialize these contradictory authority figures. And this violence always undermines itself because true authority would not require repeated violent acts of substantialization. But, for McGowan, this neurosis is a post-philosophical political response to the truth of freedom in history, which has been unconcealed by (Hegel's) philosophy once and for all. He remarks:

> The end of history is not the end of politics. In some sense, it marks the beginning of political contestation in its most authentic form. Rather than struggling for freedom, subjects must now struggle for the form of life most adequate to their freedom[78].

At first glance, McGowan's thought seems compatible with Hegel's famous lines on the owl of Minerva, which were already referred to above. Here's the paragraph in full:

> One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the *thought* of the world, it appears only when actuality has completed its process of formation and attained its finished state. The teaching of the concept, which is also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal [*das Ideale*] first appears over against the real and that the ideal grasps this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling of dusk[79].

[77] Ivi, 149-153.
[78] McGowan (2019, 152).
[79] Hegel (2008, 16).

So, as per McGowan's interpretation, *first*, there is the historical eruption of freedom in the (hitherto unfree) world in and through the revolutions he names (starting with the French), and *then* philosophy conceptualizes this freedom, philosophy says: there has been freedom in the world and thus history is at an end. My issue with this interpretation is that it introduces a gap between the form and content of freedom. Freedom first appears as a particular content in history, then philosophy gives it the dignity of its proper universal form (freedom as the ideal correlate of the contradiction in being). However, we neurotically disavow this formal universal freedom and thereby fail to give it concrete content in and through a political form of life.

To be sure, the problem with this definition of freedom as applicable to political life is not that it is merely formal and has a form that cannot be transformed into content (this is the charge usually levied against Kant's understanding of freedom). Rather, the problem is that this understanding of freedom (both McGowan's and Kant's) is not formal enough[80]. McGowan's definition of freedom is, as it were, brimming with content both historical and conceptual. The preliminary question it raises is whether freedom would not exist in the world if the French Revolution had not happened. Hegel does not necessarily succumb to this historicism (or to the form-content dichotomy) but McGowan's "Hegelian" definition of freedom is in-formed through and through by historical content, which, thereby, allows him to proclaim the end of history. This line of thinking also introduces another split: between potentiality and actuality. First, there is the actuality of freedom in history, which philosophy recognizes as actual but then, because of society's neurosis, this historically actualized freedom regresses into a potential that needs to be actualized again through politics.

Despite McGowan's intentions, his philosophical defense of the end of history does not help counteract our contemporary situation of lost/closed future(s), presentism, déjà vu, in a word, of the end of history and even risks feeding into it further by luring philosophy into complacency: philosophy has done its job by identifying and declaring history's end and now politics must step up to actualize this end-historical freedom. Against the interpretations of the end of history discussed so far (those of Kojève, Fukuyama, Žižek, and McGowan), I want to assert Virno's (arguably Hegelian – in spirit if not in name –) diagnosis of the end of history as a *symptom* of our time, which demands philosophical analysis rather than acceptance or celebration. *Pace* Žižek, not every epoch experiences itself as living at the end of history, but, uniquely, only our modern epoch, *because* we are most aware (whether consciously or unconsciously) of the historical dimension of our experience. Or more precisely, modernity is the epoch wherein what historicizes history comes out in the open for the first time in history. In his book, Virno explicates *that which historicizes* through the interrelated registers of memory, temporality, and (a historical materialist analysis of) labor-power. While memory (discussed below) is the meta-register that makes the other two possible, the analysis of labor-power renders the historically unique character of our epoch most concretely palpable. Capitalism is premised on the market exchange of one special commodity over all others, namely, labor-power, which is the commodified capacity to produce commodities. However, labor power is not an actually existing commodity like other commodities; in fact, labor power as such *never* exists in an empirical manifestation. Labor power is the pure potential, the capacity to labor as such – as opposed to actual effective labor that produces commodities. This capacity is the a-temporal condition of possibility of temporally specific labor (in the past, present, future). In capitalism, not only does the pure a-

[80] For the critique that Kant is not formal enough, see Ruda, Comay (2018, 11-28).

temporal potential to labor become explicit but this potential – labor-power – is radically historicized. Labor-power is bought and sold *as if* it were an actually existing empirical commodity. As mentioned, in Virno's analysis, labor-power is homologous to temporality and memory. In capitalism, labor power, as that which historicizes (makes the historically specific practices of human labor possible), is itself historicized. If labor power is considered (à la Virno) as the pre-history or meta-history of historically specific labor, then «capitalism *historicizes meta-history*»[81]. And human beings have a pre-history precisely because we are born without instincts and lacking a pre-given environment, instead of which we have «absolutely generic faculties»[82] (e.g., «Language, intellect, memory, labor-power, and the undifferentiated disposition towards pleasure»). Virno writes:

> The only potentials, properly speaking, are those that attest to human beings' poverty of instinct, undefined nature, and characteristic, constant disorientation. Having faculties is the sign of a lacuna: that is to say, it demonstrates the lack of a pre-given environment in which we can take an innately secure place once and for all time.[83]

Lacking a fixed environment and instincts tied to such an environment, it becomes very difficult to explain how we can act at all without positing pure potential or disposition. To take an example from structural linguistics, we cannot conceive of the phenomenon of speech (*parole*) without positing language (*langue*) as a pure potential, which can never manifest as such as an empirical totality. To note in passing, Hegel's speculative anthropology in the *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* is precisely an account of spirit's pre-history as the «natural soul»[84], an account thoroughly characterized by the not-yet-spirit soul's «poverty of instinct, undefined nature, and characteristic, constant disorientation»[85] in response to which spirit emerges as spirit through the habitual cultivation of potentials or dispositions[86]. Based on this discussion of labor power, one (provisional) explanation of the symptom of the end of history is the conflation in capitalism of prehistory and history. As per Virno's «paradoxical formula»: «the historicity of experience postulates the permanence of pre-history within history. And vice versa: *the idea of an 'end of History'* derives from the apparent liquidation or overcoming of pre-history»[87]. This account allows for a distinction between modernity (as the becoming explicit of the meta-historical conditions of historicity) and capitalism (as the historicization of meta-history), linking the experience of the end of history to the latter but not necessarily to the former.

For further clarification, I will briefly discuss Virno's account of memory vis-à-vis historicity, which he develops through a careful critical reading of Henri Bergson's conception of the «memory of the present». The analysis begins with the commonplace phenomenon of déjà vu (or what Bergson calls «false recognition») wherein one experiences the present as a repetition of the past: the experience that this has already happened; I have already lived through this. However, this recognition of the past in the present is precisely *false*: one feels that one can *almost* predict the future but cannot *actually* do it[88]. Crucially,

[81] Virno (2015, 161).
[82] Ivi, 88.
[83] Ivi, 87-88.
[84] Hegel (2007, 29, §389).
[85] Virno (2015, 87).
[86] Hegel (2007, 130-136, §§409-410).
[87] Virno (2015, 186).
[88] Ivi, 9.

déjà vu symptomatically reveals that every present experience is simultaneously experienced in two registers, that of the perceived present and its memory (of the present), which we can relate to the above-discussed categories of history and pre-history, actual labor and (potential) labor power:

> […] memory exhibits a difference of nature as compared to perception, and, at the same time, an equal intensity. It captures the same current moment as perception does, but in an essentially different manner. The fleeting present is always grasped in two distinct and concomitant aspects (which are concomitant precisely because they are distinct).[89]

In other words, the distinction or gap between the two concomitant aspects of perception and memory is what makes déjà vu possible as a collapse of this distinction: I experience déjà vu insofar as I experience the memory of the present (in the present) as the empirical past. Further, déjà vu also points to «the condition of possibility of memory in general. There would be no memory at all, if it were not, first of all, memory of the present»[90]. If there were only a single register of perception, the perceived present moments would simply evanescently transition into the next moment of perception – a series of pure vanishing "nows" without a continuum.

Further, Virno relates perception to the actual and memory to the virtual, claiming that «in the virtual there is more – not less – than in the actual»[91]. And this excessiveness of the virtual is due to its form. The virtual has the same content as the actual, but in the peculiar form of the past. This form is that of *the past as such*, a non-chronological past, «past-in-general»[92] which Virno (as discussed above) relates to capacity, potentiality, disposition – in distinction to their actualization in action – as well as to language as a virtual totality simultaneously opposed to and united with the spoken instance of a single word. The key point remains that of the dialectical unity in distinction of these two registers and Virno cautions against undialectically prioritizing either one over the other:

> The symmetrical errors usually committed with regard to each of the two (believing that memory follows perception, believing that the possible precedes the real) require a single correction. The virtual is simultaneous to the actual because memory is simultaneous to perception[93].

He calls this simultaneity of the virtual and actual a formal or transcendental anachronism[94], which is the condition of possibility of at once memory and historicity. Virno writes:

> There would be no history, then, if the instant that I am living through were only perceived, rather than also being remembered as I experience it; if the "totality of what we are seeing, hearing and experiencing" were not at each moment split into "actual and virtual, perception on

[89] Ivi, 11.
[90] Ivi, 12.
[91] Ivi, 16.
[92] Virno (2015, 27).
[93] Ivi, 17.
[94] An anonymous reviewer noted the resonance between the present analysis and the work of Ernst Bloch. Virno (2015, 140) credits Bloch with coining the phrase «contemporaneity of the non-contemporary». However, by this phrase, Bloch (1991, 97-117) generally refers to empirical anachronism: the persistence of *actual* pre-capitalist social forms within capitalism. Virno's notion of transcendental anachronism pushes this thought in a much more radical direction.

> the one side and memory on the other". The formal anachronism, whose prerogative is to display both the intertwining and the hiatus between the possible and the real, is neither anti-historical nor supra-historical, but, so to speak, *historicising*[95].

And what makes us modern is that we increasingly experience this formal anachronism, i.e., we experience the historicity of our own experience. The symptom of déjà vu acts as a defense or reaction against this experience by turning the formal anachronism into a real anachronism. It reduces the two into one. We experience the potentiality/virtuality of the present simply as a repetition of the past actuality, thus destroying both the present (as the repetition of the past) and the past (as merely the chronologically prior present). The feeling of the end of history is the result of the obfuscation of the excessive *formal* virtuality of the present by rendering it a mere repetition of an actual past *content*[96]. It is only because history is simultaneously moving in these two registers that we can feel its stuckness.

Perhaps this discussion offers another way to approach Hegel's *Doppelsatz* – the actual is the rational and the rational is the actual – as well as his thinking of history. To give up on the dialectical concomitance-in-distinction between rationality and actuality is to destroy both. And history is only history because it is internally riven between potentiality and actuality in each and every moment. At the outset of his *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, Hegel points out the «contradiction» between philosophy and history, which his philosophy aims to resolve:

> We cannot ever give up thinking; that is how we differ from the animals. There is a thinking in our perception, in our cognition and our intellect, in our drives and our volition (to the extent that these are human). But for that reason, the appeal to thinking may seem unsatisfying here, because in history our thinking is subordinated to the given and to what exists; it has all this as its basis and is governed by it. Philosophy, however, has thoughts of its own, brought forth by speculation from within itself and without reference to what is[97].

What Hegel calls thinking here, which is part of our perception, cognition, intellect, drives, and volition, can be linked to memory (the form of non-chronological past), capacity, and disposition. In other words, every concrete, actual, particular, historical act of thinking is necessarily accompanied by the universal form of thought as such. And to comprehend history is to comprehend this fundamental splitness of human experience between the actual and virtual, between real and the rational. The impossible (and therefore *real*) task of Hegel's philosophy of history is to reconcile the pure thoughts of logic (philosophy) with everything that is given and exists (history). And the given is not simply nature because there is spirit, which, Hegel tells us, is the «unity of actuality and possibility»[98].

[95] Virno (2015, 29, original italics).
[96] Ivi, 49.
[97] PH, 10.
[98] Hegel (2007, 18, §383).

Bibliography

Arndt, A. (2020), *Hegel's Philosophy of World History*, in Bykova, M. F., Westphal, K. R. (eds.), *The Palgrave Hegel Handbook*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 453-466.

Bloch, E. (1991), *Heritage of our Time*, trans. by Plaice, N., Plaice, S., Cambridge: Polity Press.

Brandom, R. (2019), *The Spirit of Trust*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Buck-Morss, S. (2009), *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Carr, D. (2014), *Experience and History: Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Comay, R., Ruda, F. (2018), *The Dash—The Other Side of Absolute Knowing*, Cambridge,The MIT Press.

Croce, B. (1915), *What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, London: Macmillan.

Dolar, M., Hamza, A., Ruda, F. (2020), *Interview with Mladen Dolar: Dialectic at a Standstill?Hegel at the Times of Covid*, «Crisis and Critique», 7, 3: 480-497.

Dolar, M. (2015), *The Owl of Minerva from Dusk till Dawn, or, Two Shades of Gray*, in «Filozofija i drustvo», 26, 4: 875-890.

— (2022), *'Who baptized Marx, Hegel or Kant?' on Alfred Sohn-Rethel and Beyond*, in «Problemi international», 5: 109-133.

Fisher, M. (2014), *Ghosts Of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures*, Winchester: Zero Books.

Fukuyama, F. (1989), *The End of History?*, in «The National Interest», 16, 3: 3-18.

Hartog, F. (2015), *Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time*, trans. by Brown, S., New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1977), *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by Miller, A. V., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— (1988), *Introduction to 'The Philosophy of History' with Selections from 'The Philosophy of Right'*, trans. by Rauch, L., Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

— (2007), *The Philosophy of Mind*, trans. by Wallace, W., Miller, A. V. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

— (2008), *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Knox T. M., Houlgate, S., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— (2010), *The Science of Logic*, trans. by Giovanni, G. di., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (2011), *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, *vol. 1: Manuscripts of the Introduction and The Lectures of 1822-3*, trans. Brown, R. E., Hodgson, P. C. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— (2018), *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by Pinkard, T., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jaeggi, R (2018), *Critique of Forms of Life*, trans. by Cronin, C., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kant, I. (1991), *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, in *Kant: Political Writings*, 2nd, Enlarged ed., trans. by Nisbet, H. B., Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 41-53.
Kojève, A. (1980), *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'*, trans. by Nichols, Jr., J. H., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Löwith, K. (1949), *Meaning in History*, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Lumsden, S. (2018). *Hegel and Pathologized Modernity or the End of Spirit in the Anthropocene*, in «History and Theory», 57, 3: 371-389.
— (2020), *Freedom and the Logic of History*, in Bykova, M. F., Westphal, K. R. (eds.), *The Palgrave Hegel Handbook*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 467-484.
Matějčková, T. (2019), *History as the Progress in the (Un)Consciousness of Freedom?,* in Krijnen, C. (ed.), *Concepts of Normativity: Kant or Hegel?*, Leiden: Brill, 196-215.
McGowan, T. (2019), *Emancipation After Hegel: Achieving a Contradictory Revolution*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Menke, C. (2013), *Hegel's Theory of Liberation: Law, Freedom, History, Society*, in «Symposium», 17, 1: 10-30.
— (2017), *Autonomy and Liberation: The Historicity of Freedom*, in Zuckert, R., Kreines, J. (eds.), *Hegel on Philosophy in History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 159-176.
Pinkard, T. (2012), *Hegel's Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pippin, R. B. (2008), *Hegel's Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Popper, K. (1966), *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* vol. 2: *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ruda, F. (2016), *Abolishing Freedom: A Plea for a Contemporary Use of Fatalism*, Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska Press.
Simoniti, J. (2020), *Hegel and the Opaque Core of History*, in «Problemi International», 4, 11-12: 201-221.
Virno, P. (2015), *Déjà Vu and the End of History*, London: Verso.
Wood, A. W. (2006), *Kant's Philosophy of History*, in Kant, I., *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, Newhaven, CT: Yale University Press, 243-262.
Yovel, Y. (1980), *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Zantvoort, B. (2018), *Unthinking Inertia: Resistance and Obsolescence in Hegel's Theory of History*, in Comay, R., Zantvoort, B. (eds.), *Hegel and Resistance: History, Politics and Dialectics*, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 117-133.
Žižek, S. (2020), *Hegel In the Future, Hegel On the Future*, in «Problemi International», 4, 11-12: 293-312.